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I. JURISDICTION
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this appeal from a judgment of
the Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2-3(a) and Rules 45 and 46 of the
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
II. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE ON APPEAL
By order of the court dated September 15, 2005, the Petition for Writ of
Certiorari was granted as to the following issue:
Whether section 31 A-22-314 of the Utah Code requires rental
companies to provide insurance coverage when other
coverage is available but is insufficient to fully compensate
injured parties or their heirs.
Appellee respectfully suggests that this is not a correct statement of the
issue since there is not a disagreement concerning whether § 31 A-22-314 requires
insurance coverage in this case. It does not. The issue is whether § 31 A-22-314 excuses
the coverage that is required of every resident owner of a motor vehicle under § 41-12a301(2)(a). See Li v. Zhang et al 2005 UT App 246 PI and P2; § 41-12a-103(9) and § 4112a-407(2).
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Appellee agrees that Carrier v. Pro-Tech Restoration, 944 P.2d 346, 350
(Utah 1997) states that the standard of review is "correctness" and is applied to the
decision of the Court of Appeals. Since the first issue is whether the Court of Appeals

1

applied the correct standard of review to the trial court decision, the standard for its
review was also "correctness" because the issue is solely one of interpretation of statutes.
Li, supra, P6.
IV. DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
§41-12a-301(2)(a) provides:
(a) every resident owner of a motor vehicle shall maintain
owner's or operator's security in effect at any time that the
motor vehicle is operated on a highway within the state;
§31A-22-302Q) provides:
(1) Every policy of insurance or combination of policies
purchased to satisfy the owner's or operator's security
requirement of Section 41-12a-301 shall include:
(a) motor vehicle liability coverage under Sections 31A-22303and31A-22-304;
(b) uninsured motorist coverage under Section 31A-22-305,
unless affirmatively waived under Subsection 31 A-22-305(4);
(c) underinsured motorist coverage under Section 31 A-22305, unless affirmatively waived under Subsection 31A-22305(9); and
(d) except as provided in Subsection (2) and subject to
Subsection (3), personal injury protection under Sections
31A-22-306 through 31A-22-309.
§31A-22-314(1) provides:
(1) A rental company shall provide its renters with primary
coverage meeting the requirements of Title 41, Chapter 12a,
Financial Responsibility of Motor Vehicle Owners and
Operators Act, unless there is other valid or collectible
insurance coverage, (italics added)

V. STATEMENT OF THE C A S is
Appellee agrees with Appellant's statement of the case, including the
stateii ii" lit of (jii is, except (I tit I ( ICICO settled for less than the $100,000 limit of its
uninsured motorist COVCKIJM1 This dors nol \ \m\vy \\w issiit"1 Iidoie (he court because
Geico's uninsured motorist coverage paid for the liability of John 1 hn nol /I iiij- I In
issue before the court concerns Enterprise's motor vehicle liability coverage for Zhang's

Several relevant facts Iwnr h<vi miuinl Imm Appellant * un^i nowever,
and the following additional statement is intended to clarify the issiles.
1. Enterprise is a I Itah corporation which owned the car in which the
davdtiii n;r, ,i iusM'iii'yi <il ill linir ol the accident. (Answer of Enterprise ^[9, R. al 17)
2. Enterprise is self insui

liability

coverage. (6/21/2002 letter from Cambridge Integrated Services Group, m
men lorandum)
3

^
'

-

'iiif nt't'lii'i'iin" weit- as follows (excerpts from the

Complaint, R. at J • M, references to Shuyu are to (ku-u

. ••,

7 Defendant John Doe, whose true nanIL i^ not
known, is the operator of a umiss-and-run" vehicle. That
vehicle is unidentified and left the scene of the accident
proximately caused by John Doe, which accident is described
hereafter
i ne accident occurred on July 21, 2000 at about
10:25 a.m. at or near mile marker 77 on Highway 89 in
Lincoln County, Wyoming, which is a two lane highway
there.
1
° \t such place and time, Shuyu was driving the
Taurus north and Beizhong was in the front passenger seat.
-x

13. At such place and time, John Doe was driving a
southbound recreational vehicle approaching the Taurus.
14. At such place and time and before, John Doe was
negligent and such negligence includes but is not limited to
operating the recreational vehicle so that it partially crossed
the center line as it approached the Taurus driven by Shuyu.
15. At such place and time and before, Shuyu was
negligent and such negligence includes but is not limited to
operation of the Taurus which crossed the center line of
Highway 89 into oncoming traffic. The Taurus was struck on
the right side by an oncoming truck, killing Beizhong.
16. John Doe and the recreational vehicle left the
scene of the accident. Both are unidentified.
18. The negligent acts and omissions of Shuyu and
John Doe directly and proximately caused the accident, the
death of Beizhong, and the damages to Beizhong's heirs and
family sought herein.
4. There were three sources of recovery for the negligence of Zhang:
Zhang's motor vehicle liability coverage with American Commerce, Enterprise's selfinsured motor vehicle liability coverage, and the decedent's underinsured motorist
coverage through Geico. The estate settled with American Commerce and Geico for the
policy limits, reserving its claim against Enterprise.
5. There were two sources of recovery for the negligence of John Doe: The
decedent's uninsured motorist coverage through Geico and Enterprise's self-insured
uninsured motorist coverage. The estate settled with Geico for $50,000 which was lA of
the policy limit. The estate did not seek recovery from Enterprise believing that the
Enterprise coverage was secondary to the Geico coverage under § 31A-22-314(1).

A

n . NUMMARY OF A R G l J M E N T S
Enterprise is inquired by § 4 l-12a-301(2)(a) to provide $25,000 of motor
vehicle liabilii
1 'jiin'prise '*

coverage for the liability of Zhang. § 31A-22-314(1) only excuses
liiH" lis n liters with "primary coverage" where other valid and

collectible motor vehicle liabihlv HI'-'HUIHT I «« naf't: »*. pu'^'Hl

h i f n p i i s e remains liable

for the $25,000 coverage but its coverage is secondary to the $100,000 moloi n lin, U
liability coverage provided b \ American Commerce, Zhang's insurer.
f.«c

I Appeals applied the correct standards for statutory

interpretation

mtement that § 3 IA-22-

314(1) could be reasonably interpreted as excusing Enterprise from jlil

i n n IIT where

other insurance is present. Li, supra, P8. The plain language of the statute only excuses
Fnlerpiise from pi vviJiiig "primary" coverage. There is an.ambiguity in the Court of
Appeals decision, however, c oi lcei i iii ig \ v I letliei Eiitei pi ise's c TV ei age

seconaai\ it*

Geico's underinsured motorist coverage and uninsured motorist coverage

;,

This ambiguity should be clarified by stating that Enterprise's motor vehicle liability
itnvi.fge is oiih ^'ititnl,tr\ lu \iiii'iic<ni Commerce's motor vehicle liability coverage.

s

VII. ARGUMENT
A. 31A-22-314(l) MUST BE READ IN THE CONTEXT
OF OTHER PROVISIONS OF TITLES 31A AND 41
In interpreting § 31A-22-314(l), the applicable rules of construction are:
If 7 In interpreting statutes, we first look to the plain language
of the statute. See Travelers/Aetna Ins. Co. v. Wilson, 2002
UT App 22l,1f 12, 51 P.3d 1288. In considering the plain
language of a statute, courts " 'presume that the legislature
used each word advisedly and give effect to each term
according to its ordinary and accepted meaning.' " Arredondo
v. Avis Rent A CarSvs.. Inc.. 2001 UT 29.^1 12, 24 P.3d 928
(citations omitted). We consider other methods of statutory
construction only when a statute is ambiguous. [FN1]
FN1. Even in construing ambiguous statutes, our focus
remains on effectuating the legislative intent. See
Intermountain Slurry Seal v. Labor Common. 2002 UT App
164^ 6. 48 P.3d 252 ("When doubt or uncertainty exists as to
the meaning or application of an act's provisions, an analysis
of the act in its entirety should be undertaken and its
provisions harmonized in accordance with the legislative
intent and purpose.").
State v. Germonto, 2003 Utah App 217 f79 73 P.3d 978
**9 Pursuant to our rules of statutory construction, we look first to the
statute's plain language to determine its meaning. Lovendahl v. Jordan Sch.
Dist. 2002 UT 130. If 21. 63 P.3d 705. "We read the plain language of the
statute as a whole, and interpret its provisions in harmony with other
statutes in the same chapter and related chapters." Miller v. Weaver, 2003
UT 12. % 17. 66 P.3d 592: see also Perrinew Kennecoft Mining Com. 911
P.2d 1290. 1292 (Utah 1996) ("[Statutory enactments are to be so
construed as to render all parts thereof relevant and meaningful." (citation
and quotation omitted)); Bus. Aviation ofSJ\> Inc. v. Medivest. Inc.. 882
P.2d 662. 665 (Utah 1994) ("[T]erms of a statute are to be interpreted as a
comprehensive whole and not in a piecemeal fashion." (citation and
quotation omitted)); *237 Jerz v. Sail Lake Counrv% 822 P.2d 770. 773
(Utah 1991) ("It is our duty to construe each act of the legislature so as to
give it full force and effect. When a construction of an act will bring it into
serious conflict with another act, our duty is to construe the acts to be in
*

harmony and avoid conflicts.'). In addition, f,[i]t is axiomatic that a statute
should be given a reasonable and sensible construction and that the
legislature did not intend an absurd or unreasonable result." State ex rel
Div. ofConsumer Prot v. GAFCorp., 760 P.2d 310, 313 (Utah 1988^
(citations omitted).

When two statutes relating to the same subject matter
unavoidably conflict, the later statute may be viewed as
having impliedly repealed inconsistent provisions of the
earlier statute. See Murray City v. Hall 663 P,2d 1314, 1318
(Utah 1983V State v. Sorensen, 617 P.2d 333, 335-36 (Utah
1980); Ellis v. Utah State Ret. Bd. 757 P.2d 882, 884-85
flJtahCt.App. 1988V "[I]mplied repeals are not favored,"
however, and we need not find an implied repeal if the
apparently inconsistent provisions can be reconciled.
Sorensen, 617 P.2d at 336. Indeed, we have an obligation to
harmonize alleged inconsistencies within and between
statutes, avoiding conflicts when possible. LM.L v. State,
2002 UT 110, % 26, 61 P.3d 1038: Jerz v. Salt Lake County.
822 P.2d 770, 773 (Utah 1991V Stahl v. Utah Transit Auth.
618 P.2d 480, 481 (Utah 1980V
Board of Education of Jordan School District v. Sands' City C'oip
234,200 1 ! T " P0andP20.
W Ink tlii "primary coverage" portion of the statute is unambiguous and
should be given cf Tal llinr v in iinlni 11« >i i • p'Mhnn ' I IK1 statute. " Fhe statute does not
:

distinguish between the various types of insurance requm

vehicles. I he ambiguity is in v- hull "pi I.n \\\ ./average" is excused by which "other valid
nterprise has assumed that the Court of Appeals
made its motor vehicle iiabilil1

^•^t/ su:o

•

usages. Appellant's

brief, p. 18 ("Until there is a finding by the trier of fact thai 1 i V, state has suflnnl

n

damages in excess of $300,000, Enterprise's liability for providing an additional $25,000
worth of coverage cannot be determined.")
The $25,000 motor vehicle liability coverage required of Enterprise for
Zhang's wrongful death liability is secondary only to the $100,000 motor vehicle liability
coverage that American Commerce provided Zhang. Geico's $100,000 underinsured
motorist coverage for Zhang's liability does not benefit Enterprise. Geico's $100,000
uninsured motorist coverage for the liability of John Doe is an entirely separate matter
having nothing to do with coverage for Zhang's liability.
Enterprise's financial responsibility under § 41-12a-301(2)(a) includes
motor vehicle liability coverage, uninsured motorist coverage, underinsured motorist
coverage, and no fault personal injury protection. § 3 lA-22-302(l). The first three
coverages include bodily injury, death, and property damage. §s 31A-22-304 through
31A-22-305.5.
In this case, American Commerce's $100,000 of motor vehicle liability
coverage is the only coverage which is "other valid or collectible insurance coverage"
with respect to Enterprise's motor vehicle liability coverage. In another case, the issue
might involve underinsured motorist coverage that a rental car company is required to
provide. In that case, "other valid or collectible insurance coverage" would be other
underinsured motorist insurance coverage. In yet another case, uninsured motorist
coverage could be the issue and then only uninsured motorist insurance coverage would
be "other valid or collectible insurance coverage". In yet other cases, non-motor vehicle
insurance that covers property damage should not excuse a rental company's primary

coverage of bodily injury. Perhaps it should not excuse a rental company's primary
coverage of property damage either, but that is another case.
The need to distinguish between these different types of coverage
underlines the importance of reading § 31A-22-314(1) in the context of other provisions
of Title 31A and Title 41. The sweeping interpretation advocated by Enterprise is not
likely to be the one intended by the legislature and amounts to the repeal of existing law
by implication. For example, suppose that in the present case there had been no motor
vehicle liability coverage by American Commerce. The presence of Geico's underinsured
motorist coverage and uninsured motorist coverage should not excuse primary motor
vehicle liability coverage by Enterprise.
B. "PRIMARY COVERAGE55 MEANS
PRIMARY COVERAGE
Arguing the obvious should not be arduous, yet it has been the burden of
several hearings. The term "primary coverage" is not a zen word play in either common
parlance or the language of statutes. A Westlaw search for the term "primary" in Title
31A will show that the term "primary" has an ordinary, well understood meaning in the
present context: first in a series or succession. This meaning and the meaning of "first in
importance" are the senses in which "primary" is used in all 20 sections of the Insurance
Code in which it appears. In the Insurance Code, the word "primary" is applied to
insurance 16 times (as opposed to primary care physician, primary market, primary
purpose, etc.). Of those 16, "primary" is contrasted with "excess"or "secondary"
coverages 10 times.

On its face, § 31A-22-314(1) first requires "primary coverage" then excuses
it when there is other insurance. This does not imply an excuse from all coverage
responsibility. Granted, the legislature could have elaborated its intent but the political
process produced only this brief provision. It can be compared to § 3 lA-22-303(2)(a)(iii)
which explicitly and completely excuses coverage:
(2) (a) A policy containing motor vehicle liability coverage
under Subsection 3 lA-22-302(l)(a) may:

(iii) if the policy is issued to a person other than a motor
vehicle business, limit the coverage afforded to a motor
vehicle business or its officers, agents, or employees to the
minimum limits under Section 3 IA-22-304, and to those
instances when there is no other valid and collectible
insurance with at least those limits, whether the other
insurance is primary, excess, or contingent; [italics added]
It can also be compared to § 3 lA-22-303(2)(b) which explicitly establishes primary and
secondary coverage:
(b)(i) The liability insurance coverage of a permissive user of
a motor vehicle owned by a motor vehicle business shall be
primary coverage.
(ii) The liability insurance coverage of a motor vehicle
business shall be secondary to the liability insurance coverage
of a permissive user as specified under Subsection (2)(b)(i).
Of itself, the failure of the legislature to give a more detailed explanation of
its intention does not favor either litigant's position on § 31A-22-314(1). This is a
fundamental flaw in Enterprise's argument that the Court of Appeals improperly read into
the statute language which does not appear anywhere in its text. Appellant's brief, p.9.
Unless this silence is coupled with the history of § 31A-22-314 and the public policy
1 A

against excusing mandatory coverage, the statute's failure to give more detail cuts both
ways.
If the legislature had intended to excuse rental companies from secondary
responsibility for coverage when there is "other valid or collectible insurance," it could
have done so by simply omitting the word "primary" from § 31A-22-314(1). This was
one of the facts which informed the decision of the Court of Appeals. Li, supra, P12.
Again, § 31A-22-314(1) first requires "primary coverage" then excuses it if
there is other insurance. The use of "primary" is peculiar because requiring coverage to
be "primary" when there is no other insurance is pointless. Whether the coverage is
"primary" or not only matters if there is other insurance. The necessary nexus between
"primary" and the existence of other insurance points to the meaning of the statute. Only
"primary coverage" by the rental company is excused when there is other insurance.
Secondary coverage is not excused. Coverage required under § 41-12a-301(2)(a) is not
excused at all. Rental companies are only granted the benefit of being second in line.
This is still a substantial benefit and a change from prior law.
An example of this benefit appears in the present case. Enterprise's
mandatory coverage in the present case includes $25,000 of uninsured motorist coverage
but § 31 A-22-314(1) made Geico's uninsured motorist coverage primary. Since Li settled
for less than Geico's limits, Enterprise was not called upon to make payment under its
secondary uninsured motorist coverage.

The history of § 31 A-22-314 is also instructive because it demonstrates that
this § has historically addressed where the rental company stands in line with regard to
other coverage. Li, supra, P12. That history is given in Li, supra, at P9:
As originally enacted in 1994, section 31 A-22-314 provided:
A rental company shall provide its renters with primary
coverage meeting the requirements of Title 41, Chapter 12a,
Financial Responsibility of Motor Vehicle Owners and
Operators Act. All coverage shall include primary defense
costs and may not be waived.
Act of March 2, 1994, ch. 316, § 17, 1994 Laws 1521, 1540.
In 1998, the legislature passed two separate amendments to
section 31 A-22-314. The first of these amendments would
have changed the statute to read:
(1) A rental company shall provide its renters with coverage
meeting the requirements of Title 41, Chapter 12a, Financial
Responsibility of Motor Vehicle Owners and Operators Act.
(2) The coverage required under Subsection (1) shall be
excess or secondary coverage to any other valid and
collectible insurance of the renter.
Act of March 4, 1998, ch. 325, § 2, 1998 Laws 1205, 1206.
The second 1998 amendment expressly superceded the first,
and is reflected in the current language of section
31 A-22-314. See Act of February 19, 1998, ch. 329, § 6, 1998
Laws 1217, 1225.
In the context of the history of this section, the lack of additional
explanation by the legislature has some meaning. If the intent was to work a substantial
change in the historical rules by excusing all coverage required under § 41-12a-301(2)(a),
one would expect a more detailed statement of that fact. Existing law should not be set
aside upon the mere possibility of such an inlent on the part of the legislature.

C. THE COURT OF APPEALS DID NOT BASE ITS DECISION
UPON PUBLIC POLICY BUT PUBLIC POLICY SUPPORTS ITS DECISION
Appellant has devoted pages 14 through 23 of its brief to attacking the
Court of Appeals analysis of public policy. The court's analysis ultimately concluded that
there are persuasive public policy arguments in favor of each party's interpretation of §
31A-22-314(l). Li, supra, P10. It based its decision on other factors. U, supra, P12.
Public policy and legislative history are only relevant considerations when
there is ambiguity in the statute's plain language. World Peace Movement of Am. v.
Newspaper Agency Corp.. 879 P.2d 253, 259 (Utah 1990); Appellant's brief, pp. 7-8.
The reference in § 31A-22-314(1) to "primary coverage" does not seem ambiguous to
Appellee. Nonetheless, if ambiguity is assumed, public policy favors the interpretation
that Enterprise's primary coverage becomes secondary and is not entirely excused.
The Court of Appeals found three relevant public policies (U, supra, P10
and PI 1): 1) a general public policy in favor of compensating tort victims, 2) a policy that
ambiguities or inconsistent provisions in insurance contracts are construed against the
insurer and in favor of coverage, and 3) a policy that $25,000 is an appropriate amount of
mandatory coverage under the Financial Responsibility Act. Enterprise disputes only the
second policy and adds two new ones concerning "freedom of contract" and avoiding
having customers pay twice for the same coverage.
The public policy of compensating tort victims is undisputed and supports
an interpretation that rental companies must provide secondary coverage. A rental

company's liability cannot exceed just compensation but if there is no secondary
coverage, there may not be just compensation to the tort victims.
With regard to interpreting a self-insurer's obligations according to rules of
insurance policy interpretation, the provisions of § 41-12a-407(2) are relevant:
(2) Persons holding a certificate of self-funded coverage
under this chapter shall pay benefits to persons injured from
the self-funded person's operation, maintenance, and use of
motor vehicles as would an insurer issuing a policy to the selffunded person containing the coverages under Section 31A22-302.
This provision justifies the Court of Appeals' use of insurance contract
interpretation rules in interpreting Enterprise's statutory coverage duties.
In passing, the argument that the payment of insurance premiums is a basis
for distinguishing between duties under insurance policies and Enterprise's duty as a selfinsurer ignores the fact that Enterprise's cost of self-insurance has been incorporated into
its rental rates. Whether or not it is called a premium, the renter is paying it.
The public policy that $25,000 is an appropriate amount of mandatory
coverage under the Financial Responsibility Act merits some discussion. First, $25,000 is
only the mandatory motor vehicle liability coverage for bodily injury or death of one
person. § 31A-22-304. Mandatory coverage under motor vehicle liability coverage,
uninsured motorist coverage, underinsured motorist coverage, and PIP could include
additional amounts in another case.
Second and more importantly, the public policy reflected in the Financial
Responsibility Act requires mandatory coverage even if there is other valid or collectible

insurance. The exceptions to this policy are few and clearly stated such as § 31A-22303(2)(a)(iii) quoted above. Counsel, for example, is obliged by law to provide at least
$25,000 of motor vehicle liability coverage even if there is other insurance coverage,
regardless of amount. If Enterprise were not a rental company, its responsibility to
provide primary or secondary coverage would be unquestioned. The issue in the present
case is whether § 31A-22-314(1) carves out an exception to the usual public policy.
Enterprise also asserts a public policy of "freedom of contract" to the extent
that a contract does not contravene public policy. Appellant's brief, pi9. The argument is
circular because the subject of the present appeal is the interpretation of the statutes
which define public policy. As Enterprise acknowledges, the rental contract terms are
invalid to the extent that they attempt to circumvent Enterprise's statutory duty to provide
mandated coverage. Appellant's brief, p.21.
Enterprise asserts a public policy against making its customers pay twice for
the same insurance coverage. Appellant's brief, p.23. The remedy to the proposed
problem is simply clarifying to all concerned what liability Enterprise covers through its
self-insurance. At that point, the customer may be expected to act in the customer's best
interest.

VIII. CONCLUSION
Beiwei Li, personal representative of the estate of Beizhong Li, respectfully
requests that the decision of the Court of Appeals be affirmed with the following
clarifications:
1. The $25,000 motor vehicle liability coverage required of Enterprise is
only secondary to the $100,000 motor vehicle liability coverage of
American Commerce. It is not secondary to Geico's underinsured motorist
coverage and uninsured motorist coverage.
2. Ambiguity in § 31 A-22-314 arises from its failure to distinguish between
types of coverage, not the term "primary coverage".
3. There is no public policy that would excuse resident owners of motor
vehicles from providing mandatory coverage if there is other valid or
collectible insurance, regardless of amount.

DATED this

sA

Hay of December, 2005.

EaVH). T&iher, Jr.
Attorney for Plaiiftiff and Appellee
Beiwei Li

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this yftA day of December, 2005, two true and
correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLEE BEIWEI LI were served by the
method indicated below to the following:
Paul M. Belnap, #0279
Joseph J. Joyce, #4857
Andrew D. Wright, #8857
A. Joseph Sano, #9925
STRONG & HANNI
3 Triad Center, Suite 500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84180
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant
Enterprise Rent-A-Car

( ^(j
( )
( )
( )

I T

U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile

